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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD CALDER and SYDNEY
CALDER,
Plaintiffs,
-vs.THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF UTAH IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, and HON.
A. H. ELLETT and HON. RAY VAN
COTT, JR., two of the Judges thereof
and CHARLES. S. MERRILL,

No. 8155

Defendants.

BRIEF

and
CHARLES S. MERRILL,
Plaint~ff,

-vs.-

No. 8159

HAROLD CALDER and SYDNEY
CALDER,
Defendants.
STATEMENT OF CASES
Most of the issues involved in the foregoing cases
are the same. Counsel for the Calders entertained some
doubt as to whether or not the questions which they wish
to have determined could properly be raised in one pro-
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ceeding. Thus, the Calders complain because the Court
below dismissed the Counterclaim which they filed in the
case brought against them by Merrill. It was feared by
counsel for the Calders that this Court might deem the
proper remedy is by appeal to secure a ruling on the
question of the dismissal of the Counterclaims filed by
the Calders. If such a view should be entertained and the
dismissal of the Counterclaims should be held to be a
final judgment as to such Counterclaims from which
an appeal could be had, the time for appeal would doubtless have elapsed before a ruling could be had on the
matters raised on the Petition for a Writ.
In view of this situation, counsel for the parties stipulated that the two proceedings might, with the approval
of this Court, be consolidated. In conformity with such
stipulation, this Court ordered that the two cases be consolidated. We shall, therefore, on behalf of the Calders,
argue both proceedings in this Brief.
The petition for a Writ contains copies of all of the
documents filed in the Court below, but to avoid confusion, we shall, in this Brief, indicate the places in the
Record on Appeal where the various documents referred
to may be found.
Charles S. Merrill, plaintiff in case No. 8159 and one
of the defendants in Case No. 8155, brought an action in
the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah whereby
he sought to recover from Harold Calder and Sydney
Calder, defendants in Case No. 8159 and plaintiffs in Case
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No. 8155, the sum of $33,000.00 which Merrill had paid on
a written contract for the purchase of 200 acres of land
situated in Davis County, Utah.
One of the grounds upon which Merrill sought to
recover back the money paid by him to the Calders was
that the contract of purchase was void because the same
was uncertain in that it did not contain a particular description of the land to be sold and therefore not in compliance with that provision of the Statute of Frauds,
U.C.A. 1953, 25-5-3 which provides:
"Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands,
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof
is in writing subscribed by the party by whom
the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing."
The particular description which it is claimed by
Merrill is fatal to the validity of the contract reads thus:
"Also additional acreage of the Seller located
in Section 5, Township 1 North, Range 1 East,
so that the acreage selected in said Section 5,
added to the acreage in Section 32 above, will total
200 acres. However the Buyer must select such
land in Section 5 in one tract, and the selection
to be made within sixty days from date."
The land covered by the contract is situated in Davis
County, Utah where the Calders reside. (R. 1 to 14)
To the Complaint filed by Merrill the Calders
answered and filed Counterclaims and a Motion for a
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Change of Venue, together with an Affidavit in support
of the Motion for a Change of Venue. In such Affidavit
it is averred that the land described in the contract and
in plaintiff's Complaint is situated in Davis County and
that the defen.dants are and for more than ten years last
past have been residents of Davis County, Utah. (R. 5)
At the time of hearing the Motion for a Change of
Venue, counsel for Merrill was granted leave to amend
the Complaint by writing thereon that the statement as
to the land to be sold being below an irrigation ditch was
made in Salt L~ke County, Utah. No evidence was offered in support of the clain1 that any representations
were made by the Calders in Salt Lake County unless the
mere unverified amendment made to the Complaint may
be said to be evidence, which we submit it is not. The
Affidavit of the defendants in support of their Motion
for a Change of Venue is not contradicted. Hon. A. H.
Ellett, one of the judges of the District Court of Salt
Lake County, denied the l\1otion for a Change of Yenue
from Salt Lake County to Davis County. (R. 7)
Defendants filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim in the cause. (R. 15) There are three Counterclaims
set out in Calders' pleadings. By the first counterclaim,
they seek to have the court determine that the contract
between Merrill and the Calders is valid, in the second
counterclaim they seek to have the court decide that
Merrill is not entitled to recover the money he has paid
on the contract upon the ground that such contract is
void because of the alleged infinnity in the description of
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the land, and the third counterclaim is for damages for
breach of the contract in that Merrill has repudiated the
same.
The court below granted the motion to dismiss the
counterclaim and entered an Order to that effect. (R.
21) While the Order dismissing the counterclaim is in
the singular, we have assumed that the Court below dismissed all three of the Counterclaims because an three
were argued and submitted to the court for its decision.
At the time the Order dismissing the Counterclaim
was made, there was pending in the Court below and not
disposed of a Motion to require Merrill to select the land
which he agreed to select in Section 5. (R. 18)
It is the contention of the Calders that the Court below was in error in denying the Motion for a Change of
Venue, in dismissing the Counterclaims set out in Calders
Amended Answer and Counterclaims and that these
errors may properly be considered and dispo·sed of in the
Petition filed herein, which is in the nature of a Petition
for a Writ of Mandamus and is expressly provided for
in Rule 65 (b) (2) and (3) of the Utah Rules of Civii
Procedure, or if it should be determined that such matters may not properly be determined by reason of the
petition for such a writ that then the same may be determined on the appeal from the order dismissing the
counterclaims.
The Calders rely upon the following points and
errors for the relief which they seek:
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POINT ONE
THAT A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS A PROPER REMEDY TO RAISE THE MATTERS
WHICH THE CALDERS SEEK TO HAVE DETERMINED.

POINT TWO
THAT IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE COURT BELOW TO
GRANT THE MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE FROM
SALT LAKE COUNTY TO DAVIS COUNTY AND IT WAS
ERROR OF THE COURT TO REFUSE TO ORDER SAID
CHANGE.

POINT THREE
THAT IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE COURT BELOW
TO HEAR AND DETERMINE THE COUNTERCLAIMS
TOUCHING THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN
THE PLAINTIFF MERRILL AND THE DEFENDANTS
CALDERS AND THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY THE CALDERS BY REASON OF PLAINTIFF
MERRILL HAVING REPUDIATED SUCH CONTRACT, AND
THAT THE COURT BELOW EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING SUCH
COUNTERCLAIMS, OR IN ANY EVENT IT WAS ERROR
TO DISMISS THE COUNTERCLAIMS.

POINT FOUR
THAT IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE COURT BELOW TO
DECIDE THAT MERRILL IS NOT ENTITLED TO
RECOVER THE MONEY WHICH HE HAS PAID ON THE
CONTRACT HERE INVOLVED ON ACCOUNT OF ANY INFIRMITY IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY
MENTIONED IN THE CONTRACT AND THE COURT BELOW FAILED TO PERFORM A DUTY IMPOSED UPON IT
WHEN IT FAILED TO SO DECIDE AND ON THE CONTRARY IN ANY EVENT THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING SUCH COUNTERCLAIMS.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
IS A PROPER REMEDY TO RAISE THE MATTERS WHICH
THE CALDERS SEEK TO HAVE DETERMINED, OR IF NOT
SUCH MATTERS MAY PROPERLY BE INQUIRED INTO
BY APPEAL.

The Calders seek the writ prayed for pursuant to
65 B (2) and (3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Such rule, in effect, provides for the same remedy that
was provided for by the Writs of Mandamus and Certiorari as known at common law and by our Code of Civil
Procedure prior to · the adoption of the Rules of Civil
Procedure by this court. It will be noted that the Note to
the rule so indicates. This court has held that:
"When a District Court erroneously refuses
to grant a change of venue, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the granting of such change."

Hale v. Barker, 70 Utah 284; 259 Pac. 928; Pace v. Wolfe,
76 Utah 368; 289 Pac. 1102; Schramm Johnson Drug Co.
v. Cox, 79 Utah 276, 284; 9 Pac. (2d) 399. So also is this
court committed to the doctrine that where a court erroneously dismisses an action or counterclaim, mandamus
may be resorted to for the purpose of securing the reinstatement of the dismissed action or counterclaim. State
v. Second District Court, 36 Utah 396; 104 Pac. 282;
Ketchum Coal Co. v. District Court of Carbon County,
48 Utah 342, 359; 159 Pac. 737; 4 A.L.R. 519; Hanson v.
Iverson, 61 Utah 172; 211 Pac. 682; Harris v. Barker, 80
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Utah 21, 26; 12 Pac. (2d) 577; Skeen v. Pratt, 87 U. 121;
48 Pac. (2d) 457; Sta,te v. Hart, 19 Utah 438; 57 Pac. 415;
State v. Hart, 26 Utah 229; 72 Pac. 938; White v. District
Court, 232 Pac. (2d) 785, not in Utah reports.

POINT TWO
IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE COURT BELOW TO
GRANT THE MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE FROM
SALT LAKE COUNTY TO DAVIS COUNTY AND IT WAS
ERROR OF THE COURT TO REFUSE TO ORDER SAID
CHANGE.

It is provided by Rule 82 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that:
"These rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the Courts of this state
or the venue of the actions therein."
It thus follows that the Utah Code of Civil Procedure
is still in effect and is controlling.
U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-1 provides:
"Actions for the following causes must be
tried in the county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof is situated, subject to
the power of the court to change the place of trial
as provided in this code (1) For the recovery of
real property, or of an estate or interest therein,
or for the determination in any form of such right
or interest, and for injuries to real property. (2)
For the partition of real property. (3) For the
foreclosure of all liens and mortgages on real
property.
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Where the real property is situated partly
in one county and partly in another, the plaintiff
may select either of the counties and the county so
selected is the proper county for the trial of such
action."
U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-4:
lOW 1~
.]fijj
IT W.t

lHill

'[vilh:

"Where the defendant has contracted in writing to perform an obligation in a particular county
of the state and resides in another county, an action on such contract obligation may be commenced and tried in the county where such obligation is to be performed or in which the defendant
resides."
U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-5 and 78-13-6 deals with transitory
causes of action arising without the state and as the
cause of action here involved did not arise without the
state, the foregoing sections dealing with transitory actions have no application here. U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-7 provides that:
"In all other cases the action must be tried in
the county in which the cause of action arises, or
in the county in which any defendant resides at
the commencement of the action, etc."
The cause of action here involved falls within the
provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-1. It is an action respecting real property. It is for the determination of what
right or interest the parties have in real estate in Davis
County by reason of the written contract entered into
by them on February 28, 1953. Mr. Merrill seeks to have
the Court hold that he does not have and never has had
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any interest or right in the real estate described in the
contract. The Calders contend that Merrill does have
such an interest and that he is, by the contract, obligated
to pay the balance of the purchase price. While we have
been unable to find a case in this jurisdiction where the
exact question here presented has been decided, :.we do
find cases where this Court has announced principles of
law that are applicable to the facts here involved.
In the case of Buckle v. Ogden Fu.rnitu.re arnd Carpet
Co., 61 Utah 559; 216 Pac. 684, it is held that it was the
intention of the legislature in enacting the law as to
venue of actions to establish the right of a defendant in
an action to have an action against him tried in the
county where he or a co-defendant resides and tha~
actions which may be tried elsewhere are limited and
restricted to those which the act itself exempts from the
general rule. Under this section an action to foreclose
mining claims is properly brought in the county where
the claim is situated. Field v. Daisy Gold Mining Co., 26
Utah 373; 73 Pac. 521. Where a note secured by a mortgage is payable in one county and the property is in
another, the foreclosure is properly had in the county
where the mortgaged property, or some part thereof, is
situated. Sherman v. Droubay, 27 Utah 47; 74 Pac. 348.
To the same effect are: Conant v. Deep Creek and C.
Valley Irr. Co., 23 Utah 627; 66 Pac. 188; 90 An1. St.
Rep. 721; First Nat'l. Bank of Coalville v. Boley, 90 Utah
341; 346; 61 Pac. (2d) 621; Boley c. District Court of 2nd
Judicial DiJ.strict in and forM organ County, 90 Utah 347;
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61 Pac. (2d) 624. In the case of Barber v. Anderson, 73
Utah 357; 274 Pac. 136, it is held that the proper county
to bring an action to set aside a Deed is the County
where the property is situated.
Our statutory law dealing with the venue of actions
touching actions affecting real estate is in accord with
the common law dealing with the same question. It is so
stated in the case of Field v. Daisy Gold Min. Co., supra.
Common law actions affecting interest in real estate were
local in their nature and therefore should be brought in
the county where the land is located, while transitory
actions could be brought where the cause of action arose
or where one or more of the defendants reside. It is
said in 56 Am. J'ur ., page 13, Sec. 11 that:
"Venue statutes providing that suits for the
possession or recovery of real estate, or for the
determination of title, rights and interest in real
estate are to be brought in the county where the
real estate or some part thereof is situated are
more or less declaratory of common-law rules and
the common-law tests of local action are usually
applied."
Quoting further from page 14 of the above Vol. of Am.
J ur., it is said:
"A statute which makes local actions for the
determination of interest in lands has been held
applicable to an action for the reformation of a
contract for the sale of land, a proceeding to set
aside a transfer of real estate as in fraud of
creditors, a suit to have a deed absolute on its
face declared a mortgage and to redeem there-
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from, an action to quiet title to real estate as
against the apparent lien of a void judgment, ~nd
a suit against an executor and devisees to subJect
real estate to the payment of debts of the ancestor
and to vacate deeds made by the devisees to third
persons."
Cases are cited in the foot notes which support the law
announced in that text. As heretofore stated there would
seem to be no escape from the conclusion that the determination of whether or not the contract between Merrill
and the Calders is valid or invalid is local in character
in that it involves "the determination" of a ''right or
interest" . . . to real propery \vithin the meaning of
U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-1.
Moreover U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-4 provides that an
action on written contracts must be had either in the
county where the defendant resides or where the obligation by its terms is to be performed. In this case the
defendants reside in Davis County and the contract by
its terms is to be performed in Davis County.
This Court on a nrunber of occasions has construed
such Section as meaning that an action on a written contract must be brought in the County where the defendant
or some of them reside or· if the contract is to be performed in a county other than that where the defendant
or some of them reside, then and only in such case may
the action be commenced in the county where the contract
is by its terms to be performed. Bnckle L Ogden Furniture and Carpet Co., 61 U. 559; 216 Pac. 684; Palfrey'man
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v. Truema,n, 105 Utah 463; 142 Pac. 677, 678; Atlas
Acceptance Corp. v. District Judge, 85 Utah 352, 39 Pac.
2d 710; Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203; 41 Pac. (2d) 281;
Simmons v. Hoyt, 109 Utah 186; 167 Pac. (2d) 27.
Apparently the trial court took the view that the
venue of this action is controlled by U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-7.
It will be seen that the provisions of that Section apply
only to actions not covered by the other provisions.
There are such cases as Schramm Johrnson Drug Co. v.
Cox, 79 Utah 276, 283; 9 Pac. (2d) 399, and the Deseret
Irrigation Company v. Mcintyre, 16 Utah 398; 52 Pac.
628, which are authority for the doctrine that if a cause
of action arises in two or more counties, the same may
be brought in either county. However, it must be a transitory action and not an action respecting real property or
a written contract, because the venue of such actions is
fixed by U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-1 and 78-13-4.
There is still another reason why the Court below
erred in failing to order a change of venue from Salt
Lake to Davis County, namely, the affidavit by the
Calders shows that they are residents of Davis County
and that the land in question is located in such county.
Indeed the court will take judicial notice of the fact that
the land is located in Davis County, Utah. There is no
competent evidence which shows or tends to show that
the Calders ever made any false or other representations
in Salt Lake County. It does appear that at the hearing
of the Motion for a Change of Venue counsel for Merrill
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asked and was granted leave to amend the allegations
with respect to false representation as having been made
in Salt Lake County, Utah. Obviously such unverified
allegations in a complaint merely signed by counsel for
Merrill are not evidence of the fact that false representations were made in Salt Lake County, or for that matter
anywhere else, especially when the same are denied by
the Calders.
Because of the foregoing reasons, the proper venue
of the action brought by Merrill against the Calders
above mentioned is in Davis County, and the Calders urge
that the defendant, District Court and .A. H. Ellett, one
of the Judges thereof, be commanded to order such
change of venue to be made.

POINT THREE
THAT IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE COURT BELOW
TO HEAR AND DETERMINE THE COUNTERCLAIMS
TOUCHING THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN
THE MERRILL AND THE CALDERS AND THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY THE CALDERS
BY REASON OF MERRILL HAVING REPUDIATED SUCH
CONTRACT, AND THAT THE COURT BELOW EX·CEEDED
ITS JURISDICTION AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING SUCH COUNTERCLAIMS, OR IN ANY EVENT
IT WAS ERROR TO DISMISS THE COUNTERCLAIMS.

By their amended answer and counterclaims the
Calders in the action brought against them by ~ferrill by
counterclaims one and three seek to have the Court determine that the contract with Merrill is not invalid because
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of the description of the land or that if such relief may
not be had that the Calders be awarded damages on
account of the repudiation of the contract by Merrill.
While the authorities generally require more convincing evidence to support a decree for specific preformance than is necessary to maintain a judgment for
damages (See 81 C.J.S., Sec. 6, page 417 and Pomeroy's
Equity 3rd Ed. Sec. 860, page 1516) the principles of
law, in each of such proceedings in the main, are the
same and therefore we shall discuss the first and third
counterclaims set out in Calders' Answer and Counterclaim under one heading.
When the Court below dismissed the Counterclaims
of the Calders, such dismissal constituted a final adjudication from which an appeal may be had. Because of
such a situation, the Calders are seeking relief by a
petition for a Writ and also by appeal so that if this
court should deem a proceeding in the nature of mandamus improper, this court is vested with authority to
pass upon the rulings complained of by the Calders by
reason of their appeal from the judgment of dismissal.
However, if the counterclaims were improperly dismissed,
it is the contention of the Calders herein that such err:or
may also properly be inquired into and determined by a
Writ.
At the hearing of this case in the court below, counsel for Mr. M'errill placed considerable reliance on the
case of Reed v. Lowe, 8 Utah 39; 29 Pac. 740, which was
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decided in 1892. It is very doubtful if that case is of any
value as applied to the facts in this case. The contract in
that case is set out in full in the opinion. Nothing whatsoever is said in the contract as to who should make the
selection of the land. That being so, it of necessity
required oral testimony to determine who should make
the selection. True the court said that the purchaser had
the option to make the selection. Evidently such conclusion must have been reached because of some oral
testimony received at the hearing before the referee because there is no language in the contract to support
that conclusion. So, also, it cannot be determined from
the opinion whether the action was brought by the successor to the original purchaser or seller. There is no
language in that contract that either the vendor or the
vendee obligated himself to make the selection. In this
cas'e it is expressly provided in the contract that the
vendee, Merrill, must select such land in Section 5 in one
tract and the selection to be made within sixty days.
It was argued in the Court below that Merrill having failed to make the selection within the period of sixty
days, he is by reason of such fact relieved from his
obligation to make the selection. In other words, Merrill
may take advantage of his expressed obligation to select
the land in Section 5 and by that means render invalid
a contract which would have been valid if he had fulfilled his obligations. We have always understood the
law to be that one may not take advantage of his own
fault. That such is the law is so elementary and of such
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unifor1n application that the citation of authorities would
seem unnecessary. If authorities are desired, see Brown
Legal Maxims, page 156, et seq.
Nor rnay it be said that there is any uncertainty
about the contract obligating Merrill to select enough
land in one piece in Section 5 to make up the 200 acres.
It is so provided in the contract. The whole contract is
in writing. Unlike the cases cited and relied upon by
~[errill, there is no need to rely upon oral evidence to
ascertain exactly what the parties obligate themselves to
do. By the terms of the contract, :Jfr. :Merrill is to select
the land he needs to make up the 200 acres in Section 5
within sixty days from the date of the contract.
It should be noted that courts of equity in proper
cases enforce the specific performance of contracts to
perform acts other than the conveyance of land. The
test applied by courts of equity is whether or not an
action at law affords adequate relief.
It is true that contracts for personal service extending over a long period or which require the performance
of a series of acts or which vest a descretion in the person obligated to perform a particular act will generally
not be specifically enforced by a court of equity because
to do so is usually burdensome and often impossible to
enforce. However, courts of equity do not hesitate to
grant specific performance of contracts to perform serv-
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ices or acts which such person has agreed to perform
when a decree of specific performance may readily and
effectively be enforced.
The law in such particular is thus stated in 49 Am.
Jur. 22:
"Jurisdiction to decree specific performance
of a contract is exercised in two classes of cases:
(1) Where the subject matter of the contract is
of such special nature or of such peculiar value
that damages, when ascertained according to legal
rules, would not be a just and reasonable substitute for or representative of that subject matter
in the hands of the party entitled to its benefits,
in other words, when damages are inadequate.
(2) Where from special and practical features or
incidents of the contract inhering in the subject
matter, in its terms, or in the relation of the
parties, it is impossible to arrive at a legal measure of damages at all, or at least with any degree
of certainity so that no real compensation can be
obtained by means of an action at law, in otherwords, where dan1ages are impracticable."
'l1 o the same effect see Pomeroy's Specific Perfonnance
of Contracts, Sec. 22 and 24, pages 59 et seq. and 75 et
seq. and cases cited in foot. notes.

We quote the following fron1 ·the section just cited:
"As a general proposition, contracts which
provide for the personal affirmative acts, or
personal service of the parties, are not specifically
enforced in equity, not because the legal re1nedy
of damages is always sufficiently certain and
adequate, but because the courts do not possess
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the means and ability of enforcing their decrees,
which would necessarily be very special and of
compelling the performance, which constitutes the
equitable remedy. Wherever from the nature of
the agreement the difficulty in the way of granting relief does not exist or can be obviated, the
principles and rules of specific performance apply
to contracts which stipulate for personal acts or
omissions, as well as to those whose subject matter is real or personal property. A few examples
of such application will suffice as illustrations.
Agreements for a separation between husband and
wife, if valid in form, made upon a sufficient consideration and executed by parties legally able
to contract, will be specifically enforced by decreeing the execution and delivery of the proper
deed, and by restraining the husband, if necessary,
from personally interfering with and molesting
his wife in violation of his covenant.
''A third class consists of contracts concerning a subject matter which would admit a sufficient remedy in damages, but which are so
connected with circumstances and incidents, or
are so incomplete in their terms, that a common
law action upon them cannot perhaps be maintained, and which, nevertheless, equity considers
as binding and enforcing by its own remedy of
specific performance.
"The following are instances: An agreement
for the purchase of timber was not the final contract in form between the parties but was to be
made complete by subsequent writings. The
remedy for the breach, by an action at law, being
doubtful, on account of this incompleteness, the
Court of chancery decreed its execution."
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It will be seen frmn the last citation of P01neroy,
page 75, that in some cases the court of equity will, in
the event mandamus is impracticable, use its injunctive
powers to accomplish the desired result.
In the Court below reliance was had by counsel for
Merrill on the Statute of Frauds to support the motion
to dismiss the counterclaim. The contract here brought
in question meets both the letter and the spirit of the

Statute of Frauds. The contract is in writing subscribed
by the party by whom the sale is to be made and also by
the person who is to purchase the property.
It is provided by the contract:
"That the seller, Calders, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey
to the buyer, and the buyer for the consideration
herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described property situated in the County of
Davis, State of Utah ... also additional acreage
of the Seller located in Section 5, Tmvnship 1
North, Range 1 East, so that the acreage selected
in said Section 5 added to the acreage in Section
32 above will total 200 acres. However, the
Buyer must select such lands in Section 5 in one
tract and the selection to be made within sixty
days from date."
It is familiar doctrine that the purpose of the Statute
of Frauds is to prevent fraud not to aid in its accomplishment. Its purpose is thus expressed in P01neroy Specifi~
Performance of Contracts, page 183, Sec. 71 as follows:
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"The primary object to be obtained by the
statute of frauds, as the term implies, is to prevent mistakes, frauds and perjuries, by substituting written for oral evidence in the most important classes of contracts, the courts of equity
have established the principle which they apply
under various circumstances, that it shall not he
used as an instrument for the accomplishment of
fraudulent purposes; designed to prevent fraud,
it shall not be permitted to work frauds."
Quoting further from the same book, Sec. 85, page 206,
it is said:
"The mmnorandum, whether consisting of one
writing or of several, must contain all the essential terms of the agreement so stated, that while
parol evidence Inay, perhaps be resorted to for
purposes of identification and to explain the situation of the parties and o.f the subject matter, it
shall not be required to supply any substantive
features which have been omitted. While the
memorandum must thus embrace the substance of
the contract, it need not describe the terms in a
complete and detached manner; it is enough tha;t
what the parties have really assented to can be
gathered from the writing and is not left to the
recollection of witnesses. When this requirement
is complied with, the demands of the statute are
satisfied, however brief and informal the document may be."
Applying the principles of law above quoted to the
case in hand, the written contract clearly provides what
the seller and buyers are required to do. There is no

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
opportunity to misunderstand its meaning, nor to make
a contract other than the one agreed to by the parties
who signed the same.
If and when Merrill selects the property which he
agrees to select and which a court of equity may require
him to select, then and in such case the description of the
property which forms the subject matter of this contract
is certain. If the contract were silent as to who should
make the selection or when the same was to be made,
then and in such case there might be merit to the claim
that the whole of the contract is not in writing. But that
is not this case. The Buyer by his contract agre·es to
make the selection within sixty days from the date of
tlie contract. Such obligation on the part of Merrill, the
buyer, is in effect a power of attorney, coupled with an
interest. That being so, the Calders could not revoke
such power, nor would the smne have terminated upon
the death of the Calders. So also does the language make
it mandatory for Merrill to exercise the power. That
being so a court of equity will require that the power
should be exercised. See 72 C.J.S. p. 406-408, Sec. 8-10.
To the same effect see -t-1 An1. J ur. p. 806-808, Sec. :2, 3,
4 and 5. Cases are collected in foot notes which support
the text.
If we take a further look at the purpose of the
Statute of Frauds, it will be seen that 1\fr. l\Ierrill is
without any standing in a court of equity to 1naintain a
right to be relieved of his obligations to perforn1 his
obligations under the contract here brought in question.
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As will be seen from the foregoing citation, the courts
are uniform in holding that the Statutes of F'rauds are
enacted to prevent fraud or as is often said to serve as
a shield, not as a sword.
If as the contract provides Merrill may select in
one piece any tract of land in Section 5, he could not be
injured because the particular tract is not 1nore definitely
described. Indeed it is apparent that such provision
cannot possibly be used to defraud Merrill, but on the
contrary is calculated to confer upon him a distinct benefit. Under the expressed terms of the contract, the
Calders are bound by any selection of the lands in Section 5 that _jlen·ill may make because they have so agreed
in writing. There is, as the statute provides, not only
a note or memorandun1 thereof in writing, but an executed contract in writing wherein the Calders agree to
make the conveyance upon Merrill making the selection
which he in turn agrees to make. Where the language is
similar to that contained in the contract here involved,
the adjudicated cases quite generally support the views
heretofore contended for.
In 49 Am. J ur., 660, Sec. 350, it is said "that there is
a definite conflict in the results of the cases determining
the sufficiency under the Statute of Frauds of a description in a land contract which gives one of the parties
the right to select the particular tract to be conveyed, but
the diversity in result appears to be due in part at least
to the circumstances present in some cases, but absent
from others that the description located the property
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from which the tract to be conveyed was to be selected,"
etc. We have exmnined the cases cited in the· foot notes
and from such examination, it is quite apparent that the
results reached in the main depends on the language used.
Thus in such cases as Fleishm(]Jfb v. Wood, 135 Cal. 256;
67 Pac. 276, the court holds that where, as here, the
plaintiff is granted a right to make the selection, there
is a compliance with the Statute of Frauds in that the
entire contract is in writing.
The basis for such holding is thus expressed in the
case of DeRemer v. Anderson, 169 Pac. 737; 41 Nev. 287;
25 A.L.R. 775, page 740 of the Pacific Reporter:
"This contract made the basis of the crosscomplaint was entered into between the plaintiff,
Fleishman and a third party and provided that
upon the third party's performing certain conditions, he should at the end of three years become
entitled to a conveyance of 4:Y2 acres of the west
half of said ten acres to be selected by the zJ!nintiff. The Court in dealing with the specific question said:
There is no uncertainity as to the 1nanner in
which the selection is required to be 1nade, nor
do we see any lack of power in a court of equity
to compel the selection to be n1ade."
It will be noted that by the cross-c01nplaint in that
case, the defendant sought to compel the plaintiff to do
that which by his contract he had agreed to do, namely
to select the nu1nber of acres designated. In the n 1atter
at bar, the party to make the selection is unnamed and
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unindicated. Were the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties here at all analogous to those
in the Fleishman Wood case, we would have no hesitancy
in concurring in the rule there asserted.
Among the cases supporting the view here contended
for is Peckham v. Lane, 81 Kan. 489; 106 Pac. 464 decided
in 1910. In that case it was contended that the contract
there involved was unenforcable where a part of a larger
tract of land should be selected by the defendant out of
the larger tract of land owned by them because of the
Statute of Frauds. Beginning at the bottom of page 465,
of the Pacific Reporter, it is said:
"This view makes it necessary to determine
\Vhether, under the statute of frauds, an action
will lie to compel the performance of a written
contract for the sale of a tract of land to be
selected out of a larger tract by the person sought
to be charged; the selection not having been made
in writing. Alabama Mineral Land Co. v. Jackson, 121 Ala. 172, 25 South. 709, 77 Am. St. Rep.
46, seems to answer this question in the negative.
We think that case, however, proceeds upon a
misconception. No reason is apparent why a person may not make a valid contract that he will
sell to another one of several pieces of real estate
of which he is the owner, to be selected by himself.
When an agreement to that effect is written out
and signed, it is a complete contract, all of the
terms of which are expressed in writing. The
owner agrees that he will first make the selection
and then make the conveyance. If he refuses to
do either, a court may compel him to do both. If
he makes the selection and then refuses to con-
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vey the court may coerce the completion of the
contract. Probably an oral selection would not be
enough to convert the contract into one for the
conveyance of the specific tract selected. If the
buyer should claim, over the denial of the owner,
that the latter had made a selection, and upon
that ground demand the conveyance of a particular tract, doubtless he could not support his contention except by written evidence, for to permit
oral testimony to settle such dispute would be
against the purpose of the statute. But he cannot
avoid the obligation to which he has cmnmitted
himself in writing, merely by refusing to act at
all. This seems so obvious that the citation of
the authorities is hardly necessary. The principle,
however, is illustrated with 1nore or less fullness
in the following cases: Ellis v. Burden, 1 Ala.
458, 466; Carpenter v. Lockhard, 1 Ind. -134;
Washburn et al v. Fletcher, 42 Wis. 152; Fleishman v. Woods, 135 Cal. 256, 67 Pac. 276." Waters
v. Ben Extrix (N.J.) 29 AT1590.
The learned author of Page on Contracts, Vol. 6, page
5785, cites with approval the foregoing case and states

the law to be as therein announced.
It will be noted in that case it was the vendor that
was to make the selection and the Court held that he
should be compelled to make the selection in an action
for specific performance.
In the case of Dohan.ey v. Womack, Texas, 1893, 20
S.W. 950, it is held that \\'here a person was sold 100
acres out of an 825 acre tract with the privilege of selecting which 100 acres he wants, the vendee beca1ne a tenant
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in com1non with the vendor in 100/825 of the tract until
he makes his selection, and the deed is not void for uncertainty. Other cases there cited to the same effect are:
Wallace v. Miller, 52 Calif. 655; Lawrence v. Ballou, 37
Cal. 518; Schenk v. Evoy, 24 Cal. 410; Brown v. Bailey,
1 Mete. (Mass.) 254.
In the case of Rains v. Apking, 247 S.W. (2d) 263,
it is held that a deed conveying a house and two acres
around the house to be surveyed and laid off and designated by grantees, when the parties could not agree on
the location of the two acres, the court appointed commissioners to lay off the land and such ruling was
affirmed.
In 117 A.L.R. page 1086, the law is thus stated:
"Under the authorities generally it is clear
that a deed is not void which purports to convey
out a larger track of land presumably owned by
the grantor, a stated number of unlocated acres
to be selected at the will of the grantee."
It will be noted tha:t numerous cases are there cited
in support of the law above quoted. See also Schmalzer
v. Ja.mnik et al, (Ill.) 95 N.E. (2d) 347 (1950).
The cases we have heretofore discussed are typical
of the cases generally which hold that under facts similar
to the facts in this case specific performance will be
ordered or damages will be awarded in case of a breach.
Doubtless the court will not desire to read the numerous
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cases dealing with the subject and therefore we have
directed its attention to only a few cases which will enable
the court to ascertain the trend of judicial authority.
POINT FOUR
THAT IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE COURT BELOW TO
DECIDE THAT MERRILL IS NOT ENTITLED TO
RECOVER THE MONEY WHICH HE HAS PAID ON THE
CONTRACT HERE INVOLVED ON ACCOUNT OF ANY INFIRMITY IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY
MENTIONED IN THE CONTRA·CT, AND THE COURT BELOW FAILED TO PERFORM A DUTY IMPOSED UPON IT
WHEN IT FAILED TO SO DECIDE AND ON THE CONTRARY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COUNTERCLAIMS.

It will be noted that the Court below dis1nissed the
counterclaim. It does not appear which counterclaim is
meant. However, counsel for l\Ierrill argued that the
counterclain1 with respect to :Merrill not being entitled
in any event to the return of the down payment should
be stricken because that question Inight properly be
raised on the general issue.
No such basis for dis1nissing the counterclain1 is set
out in the motion, and therefore, the record shows that
the amended counterclain1 was dis1nissed as recited in
the motion "because the san1e does not state facts sufficient upon which to constitute a clain1 against the
plaintiff.
Moreover, it is a well established rule of equitable
jurisdiction that when equity takes jurisdiction of a controversy, it will decide every other contention connected
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with the subject matter of the suit. The law in such
particular is thus stated in 49 Am. Jur. page 192, Sec.
170:
"The general rule that equity, having taken
jurisdiction of a cause, will retain jurisdiction of
the litigation and grant full relief is applied to
actions for specific performance. Where a court
of equity properly acquires jurisdiction of a cause
for specific perfonnance, it may go on to complete adjudication of all 1natters properly presented and involved in the case, even to the extent
of adjudicating legal rights and granting legal
remedies, as well as granting all appropriate
equitable relief. Once the jurisdiction of equity
has attached, it will itself proceed to round out
the whole circle of the controversy, and decide
every other contention connected with the subject matter of the suit essential to do complete
justice. Damages may be awarded in a proper
case either independently or in addition to a
decree of specific performance. Even though
specific performance is denied, the court may
in a proper case retain the bill and adjudicate and
adjust any other equities which have arisen
between the parties."
In this case l\Ierrill seeks a rescission of the contract
which is an equitable proceeding and the Calders seek a
construction of the contract to the effect that the same
is legal and enforceable or if not enforceable that the
Calders are entitled to retain the money paid on the
contract. That being the nature of this proceeding on
behalf of both :Merrill and the Calders, the courts will
dispose of all such issues, and not require· the same to
be again litigated.
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The law touching the question of the right of a party
to recover back money paid on a contract such as that
here involved is thus stated in 49 Am. J'ur., page 870,
Sec. 564:
"Where Yendor is Ready and Willing to Perform.-According to the great weight of authority,
the vendee, under an agreement for the sale and
purchase of land which does not satisfy the statute
of frauds, cannot recover back payments upon
the purchase price if the vendor has not repudiated the contract but is ready, willing, and able
to perform in accordance therewith, even though
the contract is not enforceable against the vendee
either at law or in equity. lTnder this rule, one
who has paid money in consideration of an oral
contract cannot rescind such contract and recover
the money paid unless the other party insists
upon the statute and refuses to perforn1 it on his
part. It is necessary for the vendee to shmr
tender of compliance on his part and a refusal
of c01npliance on the part of the vendor. This is
held true as to payments Inade to a third person
for the benefit of the vendor, to be paid over to
him upon his making the conveyance. It has
been said that the purpose of the statute, so far
as it relates to the sale of land, is to protect the
vendor only, and the vendee, seeking to recover
purchase money, cannot set up the statute against
a vendor who is ready and willing to perforn1. The
contract cannot be considered void so long as he
for the protection of whose rights the statute is
made is willing to treat and consider the contract
good.
"In a few jurisdictions, the vendee is allowed
to recover back payments made on the purchase
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price under a contract which does not satisfy the
sta:tute of frauds, notwithstanding the vendor is
ready, able, and willing to perform, unless there
has been such part performance by possession or
otherwise as would take the contract out of the
statute and enable the vendee to enforce it in
equity against the vendor. It is to be observed
that in most of the jurisdictions which follow the
latter view allowing recovery of payments made,
notwithstanding the readiness, ability, or willingness of the vendor to perform, the statute, unlike
the form of Sec. 4 of the original statute of frauds
( 29 Car II, c 3), declared the oral contract void,
whereas in most of the jurisdictions following the
general rule denying recovery, the statute merely
declared that no action should be brought upon
the oral contract. In some jurisdictions, however,
notwithstanding the statute declares that oral
contracts shall not be valid, the courts adhere to
the rule that the vendee may recover the amount
paid upon the purchase price under the terms of
an oral contract which does not satisfy the statute
if the vendor is ready, able and willing to perform.
Even where this minority view prevails, if there
has been such part performance as will entitle
the vendee, irrespective of a sufficient memorandum, to enforce the contract against the vendor,
he cannot recover back a part payment, if the
vendor is ready and willing to perform.
"If a contract for the sale of land is signed
by the vendor and delivered to and accepted by
the vendee although not signed by the latter, the
contract is binding on the vendor and is therefore
a sufficient consideration for payments made by
the vendee, and he cannot, on the ground that the
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contract was not signed by him, recover the. P~Y
merrts so made if the vendor is able and wlllmg
to perform."
The same doctrine is announced in L.R.A. 1916 D,
page 472 where there are also collected nu1nerous cases
which support the text.
On page 478 of L.R.A. 1916 D will be found a collection and discussion of the cases which support the
minority view, from which it will be seen that there is
considerable confusion among the cases even in the same
jurisdiction, especially is that true in the State of Alabama. The statement made in the above quoted text that
the conflict in the authorities is in most of the jurisdictions which hold that a recovery may not be had is based
upon statutes merely declaring that no action should be
brought upon oral contracts is not borne out by the cases,
especially is that true of the cases in the \Yestern states
where the statutes are identical, or substantially the
same as the Statute of l-:-tah. A number of the cases are
based upon the fact that the statute is, as the language
thereof shows, for the protection of the seller of the land
and not for the purchaser. \V e shall not discuss the
cases which lend some color to the view that 1noney paid
on an oral contract for the sale of land may be recovered
back because we are not here concerned with an oral contract, but with a written contract, which if and when :Mr.
Merrill performs his obligations, is in all respects in
conformity with the requirements of the Statute of
F'rauds.
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Of the numerous cases there cited, we direct the
attention of the court to a few from our neighbors as
typical of the cases generally. It will be noted that where
payments have been made on a contract the same may
not be recovered back by the one making the payment
even though specific performance or damages will not
be awarded where the vendor is ready, able and willing
to perform his part of the contract.
In the case of Toffery v. Ka,ufma.n, 134 Cal. 391, 66
Pac. -J-71, 86 Am. St. Rep. (decided in 1901 by the Supreme
Court of California), it is held that where $500.00 was
paid down on an oral contract and the plaintiff sought
to recover the same, he could not prevail where the
defendant was ready, able and willing to convey the
property upon payment of the amount remaining unpaid.
In the course of the opinion (page 471 of Pacific Reporter) it is said:
"This action is not one to enforce the specific
performance of a parol contract for the sale of
land, nor is it one in which a defense is based
upon the statute of frauds. The plaintiff having
made the contract, which is not unlawful, nor
against public policy and having paid the money
thereunder, cannot of his own volition and without fault of defendants, come into court and
receive the assistance thereof to recover the
money voluntarily paid."
On page 472 of the case, it is further said:
"The right of the vendee of land under a
verbal contract to recover the money or other
consideration paid is by all the authorities con-
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fined to those cases where the vendor has refused
or become unable to carry out the contract, the
plaintiff himself having faithfully performed or
offered to perform on his part."
A number of cases are cited in the foregoing case
to the same effect.
In this case, Merrill contends that the time for making the selection has passed. Just how he may be heard
to complaint because of such fact is difficult to understand where, as here, the Calders are ready, able and
willing to perform their part of the contract, notwithstanding the delay.
Another well considered case decided by the Supreme
Court of our neighboring state of Colorado is Gabarmo
v. Union Sa.vings and Loan Assn., 107 Colo. 140; 109
Pac. (2d) 638, 132 A.L.R. 1489. In that case the statute
involved is almost identical with the statute relied upon
by Merrill in this action. In that case the contract was
oral. A check containing the words "Deposit on Detroit
Apt., price $27,500, free and clear" was given as the
initial payrnent. In an action brought to recover on the
check, the court held that such an action could be maintained and the fa.ct that the same was given as a down
payment for the purchase price of land was no defense.
In that case the court cites a number of cases, including
a few which the court indicated held to the contrary.
However, as will be seen from the cases cited in the foot
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note to 49 Am. Jur. 870, and L.R.A. 1916 D, page 472,
the great weight of authority of the adjudicated cases
and the text writers are in accord with the contention
here being urged by the Calders, even if the contract is
oral, which is not the fact in this case.
It is submitted that the Motion to Strike the Counterclaims should have been denied. The Calders pray that
the errors complained of be corrected, that the case be
remanded to the District Court with directions to that
court to grant the change of venue prayed and that the
counterclaims of the Oalders be reinstated.

Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE FADEL,
ELIAS HANSEN,
Attorneys for Calders.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.

vsr.~ '~rr g"M,a~

a3.1.Il

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

